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Abstract 
This paper discusses alternative political economic perspectives on competition (anti-
trust) and industrial policies (IP), in theory and in practice, while critically assessing 
recent European IP in this context. It develops a new framework for IP, which 
emphasises the sustainability of value and wealth creation at the firm, meso and 
supranational levels, and explores its implications for IP in general and European IP in 
particular. It views current EU policies as a step in the right direction, but argues that 
they need to pay more attention to the issue of economic sustainability, the link between 
corporate, public and supranational governance, and the impact  that different power 
structures and hierarchies of agencies have on industrial policies for sustainable value 
and wealth creation. The limitations of self-monitoring and diversity suggest the need for 
an accountable supranational competition and regulatory policy organisation with a 
strong focus on economic sustainability. 
 
I. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to critically assess existing perspectives on industrial and 
competition policies by paying particular attention to the policies of the European Union 
(EU). We explore the idea that non-neoclassical economics views have now achieved an 
almost mainstream status within EU policy circles. We claim that this is a step in the 
right direction, but also that more progress can be made. This requires strengthening 
extant knowledge on the issue of industrial policy (IP). The next section of the paper 
discusses alternative perspectives on competition policy and IP. The third section 
discusses international practice, especially European industrial policies, in the context of 
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new trends. The fourth section sketches a novel conceptual framework and explores its 
implications for current European policies. The last section offers a summary and 
conclusions. 
 
II. Industrial and Competition Policy: Alternative Perspectives 
The term ‘industrial policy’ (IP) refers to a set of measures taken by a government that 
aim to influence a country’s industrial performance towards a desired objective and the 
measures taken to implement this objective.1 Competition (or anti-trust in the USA) 
policies (CPs) refer to the stance governments adopt towards competition and 
cooperation between firms in industries, and the measures they take to implement their 
objectives. CPs usually attempt to influence the degree of competition or monopoly in 
industries, such as, for example, the car industry. 
 
Most government measures and policies affect industry one way or the other. Therefore, 
boundaries between industrial/competition/anti-trust policy and other policies, such as 
technology policy, regional policy, structural policy, competitiveness policy, and even 
macroeconomic policy, are not always clear. The closest we can get to a demarcation line 
is arguably by referring to a government’s own perception of what it aims IP and CP to 
be, alongside the underlying body of theoretical knowledge, purposely informing such 
perception. The government’s objective is usually assumed to be the improvement of the 
welfare of its citizens, which is achieved when resources are allocated efficiently, and 
wealth creation and appropriation by the nation as a whole, take place at a pace 
                                                 
 
 4 
preferably faster than in other countries (improved international competitiveness).2 
Industry is believed to be an important contributor to the process of wealth creation for 
numerous reasons including, for example, the high degree of tradability of its products, 
its positive link with technology, innovation and productivity growth, and even the close 
links between manufacturing and services (Pitelis and Antonakis, 2003; Amsden, 2008). 
It follows that a government wishing to improve the welfare of its citizens will be well 
advised to design measures that foster the efficient allocation of resources and the 
creation and capture of wealth, i.e. to devise policies that lead to a strong, productive, 
competitive and wealthy economy. There is agreement among economists that the right 
type and degree of competition between firms and industries can be a potent means of 
facilitating this desired objective. However, views differ as to what should be the role, the 
right type and degree, and even the nature (including the very definition) of competition. 
It is not possible to discuss all these issues in detail in this article, but a brief overview of 
alternative perspectives may facilitate a better understanding of some important themes. 
 
The Neoclassical Industrial Organisation (IO) Market Failure-based Perspective 
The dominant perspective on industrial and competition (anti-trust) policy among 
academic circles is still the mainstream neoclassical one. It is based on the theory of 
competition, monopoly and industry organisation (IO). In the context of this approach, 
competition is seen as a type of industry structure. This can be a perfect or an imperfect 
structure. Perfect competition is characterised by the existence of numerous firms that 
produce very similar (homogenous) products, full and symmetrically distributed 
knowledge about firm and industry conditions (demand and cost conditions, in 
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particular), and free mobility of resources (for example no barriers to entry and exit of 
firms in the industry). Under such conditions, firms are price-takers; they cannot 
influence the prices, which are determined by the interplay of supply and demand in the 
industry. In addition, such prices only cover average costs, and firms only make a normal 
profit. 
The opposite of perfect competition is monopoly. Here we have only one firm in 
the industry, with blockaded entry. By restricting output, a monopolist that maximises 
profits will charge a price that is higher than the price of a perfectly competitive firm. As 
a result, consumers will end up with lower quantities of goods, for which they will pay 
higher prices. This is bad for consumers, and leads to misallocation of resources because 
output is restricted compared to that of perfect competition. 
According to the neoclassical view, the main concern of an economy should be to 
allocate its scarce resources (capital, land, labour and knowledge) efficiently and in so 
doing to maximise the welfare of its consumers. In this context, monopolistic restrictions 
lead to market failure due to the ‘wrong’ type of market structure (so-called structural 
market failure). When such failures exist, the neoclassical approach posits that the 
government can step in to correct them. However, there are problems with this approach. 
First, in reality, the two polar opposites – monopoly and perfect competition  – are 
recognised to be unrealistic, with the most prevalent form of industry structure being 
some sort of ‘imperfect competition’, such as ‘monopolistic competition’, ‘oligopolistic 
competition’ and/or big business competition (Baumol, 1991). An industry structure is 
characterised as ‘oligopolistic’ when there is interdependence between a small number of 
usually rather large firms. When one firm acts, the other is affected and needs to react. 
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This raises the question of how imperfect, or big business competition, is linked to 
efficient resource allocation. A second problem is that the comparison between monopoly 
and perfect competition assumes that they face the same cost and demand conditions, and 
that they have the same information/knowledge, technology, resources and competences. 
However, if this is not the case, one has to take into account such differences.3 
To gauge the degree of monopoly in real life industries, economists usually use 
measures of concentration. If an industry is highly concentrated, it is presumed that there 
is prima facie evidence for reduced competition, the possibility for collusion over prices, 
strategic barriers to entry and high prices. However, the link between concentration and 
market power in the form of higher profits is questionable. It may, for example, be the 
case that more efficient firms grow larger (which in turn increases concentration) while 
also being more profitable (Demsetz, 1973). The crucial issue in this context is collusion 
over prices and barriers to entry. Collusion over prices is normally illegal in most 
countries, but notoriously difficult to identify, especially when it is not overt (the case of 
‘tacit’ collusion). Studies on barriers to entry, on the other hand, have confirmed their 
existence and importance (Scherer & Ross, 1990). Even barriers to entry, however, could 
be seen in some cases as an inducement to innovation (Pitelis, 2004). 
In order to obtain an indication of the importance of monopoly welfare losses on 
the economy-wide level, one has to try and measure such losses. There are various ways 
to do this, and a large empirical literature has developed as a consequence. Results vary 
greatly, but it is widely believed that some static losses do exist, and therefore that 
monopoly is a potentially serious problem that needs to be dealt with by the government. 
In principle, the government could step in to ensure perfectly competitive markets by, for 
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example, discouraging mergers and acquisitions, encouraging mobility and even breaking 
up large firms. If this took place simultaneously in all industries, consumer welfare would 
be maximised. However, if this is not the case, perfectly competitive structures in one 
industry but not in others need not necessarily improve overall welfare. This is the 
problem of ‘second best’. In a second best world, what can the scope of competition/anti-
trust policy be? Many economists believe that a degree of ‘workable competition’ is still 
desirable (see Hunt, 2000 for an account). Workable competition could take the form of 
guarding against the acquisition and abuse of monopoly power and the support of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In practice, this can be done by, for example, 
barring a firm from achieving a certain market share and/or pursuing certain restrictive 
practices, such as price collusion (Scherer and Ross, 1990), and by devising measures 
that foster a level playing field and support new firm creation. 
The focus on static ‘welfare losses’ fails to account for any differences in 
efficiency between perfectly competitive firms and oligopolistic firms with a degree of 
monopoly power. There are various dimensions of this issue. One of these dimensions 
relates to differences in costs. Oliver Williamson, for example, has argued that 
monopolies may have lower cost curves, which implies an efficiency gain vis-à-vis the 
perfectly competitive industry. This gain should be traded off against any static losses 
Williamson’s trade-off (Scherer and Ross, 1990). In addition to the potential efficiency 
gains, oligopolistic market structures may also be more conducive to innovation 
(Baumol, 1991). Such innovation can result in dynamic productivity benefits, a factor 
that must also be taken into account. 
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A way for firms to increase their size and consequently, ceteris paribus, their 
industry concentration, is to undertake activities that could potentially take place in the 
market.  For example, firms may take over their suppliers or distributors rather than 
dealing with them at arm’s length. There are numerous reasons why firms could 
‘integrate’, including the pursuit of market power through the reduction in the forces of 
competition and so on (Porter, 1980). However, one possibility is that firms integrate 
because market exchange is costly; finding and dealing with other firms can lead to high 
exchange or transaction costs. Coase (1937), Williamson (1975) and many other 
economists believe that reducing market transaction costs is an important reason for the 
existence and boundaries (and therefore, the size) of firms. If increasing firm size is the 
result of transaction cost reductions, such efficiency gains should be taken into account 
by regulatory bodies. A vertical acquisition, for example, could be motivated by 
efficiency, not by market power motives. Similarly, cooperation may not involve 
collusion over prices but be motivated by knowledge-acquisition and enhance innovation 
and dynamic efficiency (Jorde and Teece, 1992). Overall, such considerations suggest a 
more lenient attitude towards large oligopolistic firms. 
In reality, it is unlikely that transaction costs and the pursuit of efficiency will be 
the exclusive determinant of firm size and/or that markets will be perfectly competitive 
(or contestable). Moreover, this approach takes technology and innovation as constant, or 
simply linked to the type of market structure (Scherer and Ross, 1990), which is rather 
limiting, as we shall see below. Nevertheless, these views have influenced industrial and 
competition policy makers, and cannot therefore be ignored. 
 
Evolutionary/Resource, Knowledge and Systems-Based Perspectives 
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The dominance of the neoclassical view on competition, monopoly and industrial 
and competition (anti-trust) policy is currently under threat. This is due to the emergence 
and recent popularity of an alternative perspective, which can broadly be defined as the 
evolutionary/resource, knowledge and systems-based perspective. This perspective 
encompasses a diverse group of contributions, all of which share the view that 
competition should not be seen as a type of market structure, and that important is not 
just the efficient allocation of scarce resources, but also the creation of value and wealth, 
and that the two are not necessarily the same (Groenewegen et al., 1994). There is a 
widespread belief that firms are very important contributors to value/wealth creation, and 
also that each firm is an individual entity, differing from other firms primarily in terms of 
its distinct resources, capabilities and knowledge. 
The lineage of this perspective can be claimed to include founding fathers, such as 
Adam Smith (1776) and Karl Marx (1959), and more recently influential economists such 
as Joseph Schumpeter (1942), Edith Penrose (1959), George Richardson (1972) and 
Nelson and Winter (1982). In brief, classical economists such as Smith and Marx focused 
on wealth creation not just on (or through) resource allocation. They viewed competition 
as a process, regulating prices and profit rates. They did not see it as a type of market 
structure. Smith (1776) described the amazing productivity gains through specialisation, 
the division of labour, the generation of skills and inventions within factories, in his 
famous analysis of the pin factory. Marx (1959) also suggested that there is a dialectical 
relationship between monopoly and competition (whereby competition leads to 
monopoly and monopoly can only maintain itself through the competitive struggle). He 
also explored their impact on technological change, the rate of profit and the ‘laws of 
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motion’ of capitalism at large. In addition, Marx focused on competition within the 
factory, and in society at large, between employers and employees, and between classes. 
This type of competition can be more accurately described as ‘conflict’. Building 
critically on Marx, Joseph Schumpeter (1942) described competition between firms as a 
process of creative destruction through innovations. He saw monopoly as a necessary and 
just, yet only temporary, reward for innovations. He attributed firm differential 
performance on differential innovativeness and saw concentration to be the result of such 
innovativeness. 
Edith Penrose’s classic 1959 book on The Theory of the Growth of the Firm can 
arguably serve as the glue that can bind such contributions together. In her book, firms 
were seen as bundles of resources, the interaction between which generates knowledge, 
which, in turn, releases excess resources. ‘Excess resources’ are an incentive to 
management for growth and innovation, as they can be put to use at almost zero marginal 
cost. Differential innovations and growth lead to concentration, which, however, can also 
be maintained through monopolistic practices (Pitelis, 2004). The world is seen as one of 
big business competition, where competition is god and the devil at the same time. 
Competition drives innovativeness, yet it is through its restriction that monopoly profit 
can be maintained. 
 Building on Penrose, Richardson (1972) observed that firms not only compete 
but also cooperate extensively. Moreover, such cooperation is not just through price 
collusion as the neoclassical theory assumes. It lies between market and hierarchy, and 
occurs when firms’ activities are complementary but dissimilar (i.e. they require different 
capabilities). Nelson and Winter (1982) subsequently developed ideas currently of import 
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to the resource-based view (RBV). Notable are those of firm ‘routines’, which 
simultaneously encapsulate the firm’s unique package of knowledge, skills and 
competences, and allow firms to operate in an evolving environment with a degree of 
path dependent institutionalisation. 
Based on contributions by Penrose (1959) and/or Demsetz (1973), the resource-
based view (RBV) emphasized the nature and characteristics of resources and resource 
creation and its link to firm-level sustainable advantage. Contributions such as Wernerfelt 
(1984), Barney (1991), Peteraf (1993), and Mahoney and Pandian (1992) emphasized the 
importance of acquisition and leveraging of resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-substitutable (VRIN). Teece (1982) and the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996; 
Spender 1996) focused most on the value creation attributes of knowledge and resources.  
The dynamic capabilities view of Teece et al. (1997) and Teece (2007) emphasized the 
role of capabilities in the identification, upgrading and leveraging of resources. More 
recently Pitelis and Teece (2009) focused on the role of capabilities in market creation 
and co-creation. 
The focus of the evolutionary and resource-based view on evolution, knowledge 
and innovation, as well as its ‘systemic’ (as opposed to market-failure) perspective, has 
arguably facilitated the emergence of a major change in industrial and competition (anti-
trust), as well as wider competitiveness policies. This, in turn, has led to more emphasis 
being placed on the knowledge and innovation-promoting potential of different 
institutional configurations. The ‘national’, regional and sectoral systems of innovation 
approach, the literature on clusters of firms, the work of Michael Porter (1990) on 
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national competitiveness, and the “varieties of capitalism” perspective, all draw upon and 
relate to this evolutionary/resource/system-based view (Pitelis, 2009a).4 
There are various other implications of the evolutionary/resource and systems-
based perspective for industrial and competition (anti-trust) policies. First, its focus on 
value and wealth creation suggests a broader welfare criterion than consumer surplus 
only (Mahoney et al, 2009). Second, superior capabilities provide yet another efficiency-
based reason for concentration. Third, competition as a dynamic process of creative 
destruction through innovation implies the need to account for the determinants to 
innovate when considering the effects of ‘monopoly’, but also more widely. Fourth, 
competition with cooperation (or ‘co-opetition’), as in Richardson, implies the need to 
account for the potential productivity benefits of co-opetition when devising competition 
policies (Jorde and Teece, 1992). Another dimension on competition relates to its 
strength, and the role of proximity and location. This links to the work of Richardson, but 
has subsequently been developed by Porter (1990), Krugman (1991), Audretsch (1998b), 
Dunning (1998), and others (see Jovanovic 2009 for an extensive account). For instance, 
Porter claims that local competition is more potent than distant (for example, foreign) 
competition. Last but not least, the degree of competition is also important.  Too much 
competition can be as bad as too little, as it can lead to a failure to exploit unit cost 
economies and to a dissipation of resources – an example begin tea production in China 
(The Financial Times, 2009a). These may have important implications in devising anti-
trust policies, as we will see below. 
 
III. International Practice and European IP in the Context of New Trends 
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Despite its evident limitations, the neoclassical perspective has dominated 
industrial and competition policy thinking in the Western world for many decades. Anti-
trust legislation in the US and the original Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome in 
Europe both seem to be directly informed and influenced by it, in theory at least.  
In reality, of course, practice has varied from theory, and also between countries 
and over time. As argued elsewhere (Pitelis, 1994), European policy, for example, has 
been described as ad-hoc, discontinuous and even inconsistent. It has been seen as ad-hoc 
because the theoretical basis of various policies was not clear. A notable example is the 
‘national champions’ or ‘picking winners’ policy, which was pursued by various 
European countries in the 1960s and 1970s. This policy involved identifying potentially 
successful firms and industries and using a number of measures like subsidies and tax 
breaks to promote them. It also involved a lenient and even encouraging attitude towards 
mergers and, in some cases (often in pursuit of considerations of fairness and 
distribution), nationalisation of utilities but also other industries perceived to be 
‘strategic’. For example, the two main characteristics of post-World War II French 
experience were a close relationship between government and business and a willingness 
to nationalize certain enterprises. This was epitomized by the government’s policy of 
creating national champions in technology and capital intensive industries that were 
dominated by global oligopolies (Friendson, 1997). Similarly, in Italy and Spain, where 
the entrepreneurs had to compete with already well-established international industrial 
core, government assistance was also very prevalent (Chandler and Hikino, 1997). In 
Germany too, large enterprises received powerful and consistent protection and tutelage 
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from the big German banks in what came to be known as "Rhenish Capitalism" 
(Wengenroth, 1997).  
The underlying hope behind this approach was that such firms could compete 
successfully with foreign rivals, thus raising export surpluses and country 
competitiveness. Evidently, however, this tended to exacerbate structural market failures, 
and was also inconsistent with the theoretical pursuit of ‘competition’. The policy was 
also pursued at a pan-European level, in the search for pan-European companies, which 
could out-compete large American multinationals. In some cases, such policies blunted 
incentives for protected firms to compete, and gave rise to ‘problematic enterprises’, or 
‘lame ducks’.5 After trying to rescue them for a number of years, European governments, 
led by Mrs Thatcher’s Britain, eventually resorted to deregulation and privatisation, as 
well as a shift of focus to small firms and entrepreneurship. This shift of focus also 
resulted in a discontinuity of policies, from emphasis on large firms and the government, 
to the centrality of small firms and the market (Pitelis, 1994). 
The approach of Japan, and the so-called ‘tigers’ of the Far East, on the other 
hand, was different. In Japan, policy was led by the then Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) (now Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry – METI) and was 
not informed by neoclassical economics (Chandler et al., 1997; Johnson, 1982). Rather, it 
involved a strongly interventionist approach by the government, intended to create 
advantages in certain sectors. Such sectors were chosen on the basis of being high value-
added, high income elasticity of demand and knowledge-intensive. In such sectors, MITI 
provided financial and other support and guidance. It regulated the degree of competition 
(neither too little, nor too fierce) by aiming at an ‘optimum’ number of firms in it,  
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protected these sectors from foreign competition at the same time, and effected 
‘technology transfer’ through the subsidization of licensing of technology from foreign 
firms. MITI also paid attention to the benefits of cooperation and the promotion of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Best, 1990). Overall, this approach to competition 
could be described as domestically focused managed competition balanced with 
cooperation (co-opetition). The approach of the East Asian ‘tigers’ was similar, although 
some of them, especially Singapore, affected ‘technology transfer’ not through licensing 
as practised by Japan, but through an inward investment policy (Pitelis, 2009a).  
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that most East Asian countries pursued 
sector-specific industrial policies (World Bank, 1993). While their approaches differed, 
the East Asian states focused their intervention on industries where entry barriers were 
high, therefore, socializing the risk involved in the development of infant industries. 
Moreover, this was important because these countries did not have sufficient knowledge-
based assets to compete with world prices (Amsden, 2001). In these countries, not only 
did government play a significant role during industrialization, but the form of state 
intervention was unique. In East Asia, both industrial targeting and firm targeting was 
conditional on performance standards. While the previous industrializers had helped their 
industries mostly by protecting the domestic market, the East Asian governments aimed 
to foster international competitiveness and export through the use of monitorable 
performance standards (Chandler et al., 1997; Chang, 2000; Rodrik 2009). 
The performance of the Japanese economy and that of the tigers in general has 
been very impressive until recently. It is not surprising that some commentators have 
attributed this success in part to their approach to competition and industrial policy (as 
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well as to other characteristics of the Far Eastern economies, such as education, an 
equitable distribution of incomes, a high savings ratio and so on) - although views on this 
still vary (Pitelis, 2001; Pitelis, 2004; Serra and Stiglitz, 2008; World Bank, 1993). As 
opponents of industrial policy observe, the problem with the success cases is that the 
counterfactuals are unavailable (Pack and Saggi, 2006). That is, we do not know how 
these economies would have performed if they had not pursued the kind of industrial 
policy they did pursue. Some empirical analyses and econometric findings show that 
industrial policy in East Asia failed to impact the growth of total factor productivity 
(Westphal, 2005). Indeed, the World Bank argues that what defined the success of East 
Asian growth was the ability of East Asian states “to get the fundamentals right.” 
According to the World Bank, market-friendly policies that ensured low inflation and 
competitive exchange rates, enhanced human capital through education, created effective 
financial systems and limited price distortions were at the heart of East Asian experience 
(World Bank, 1993). According to the World Bank, moreover, industrial policy attempts 
to achieve higher productivity by changing industrial structure were not successful. These 
views regard the role of industrial policy as minimal and also point out to countries such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia, which failed to drive heavy state-directed industrialization 
and technological leapfrogging despite similar approaches to industrial policy. 
To attribute the success of the Far East just to its approach to competition and its 
interventionist IP, especially given similar but less successful interventionist policies by 
Western governments in the past, implies either misconceived policies by the latter, or a 
higher degree of in-competence. This may well be the case (Amsden, 2001), but there is 
also a second potential argument. In contrast to the West, the Japanese and other East 
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Asian governments were not influenced by the neoclassical perspective and favoured 
instead an approach that focused on resource creation (not just through resource 
allocation) through big business competition for innovations, growth, productivity and 
competitiveness. This approach, which seems to combine Schumpeterian and Penrosean 
ideas with its accompanied focus on production and organisation (Best, 1990) may well 
be a differentia specifica of the Far Eastern approach. It has been associated with major 
innovations such as total quality, ‘just-in-time’, lifetime employment, and the coexistence 
of competition with cooperation (co-opetition).  
Developments in economics and management in recent years such as the new 
international trade theory, the new endogenous growth theory, the new location 
economics, the resource and dynamic capabilities-based perspective, and the national, 
regional and/or sectoral systems of innovation approach (Wignaraja, 2003; Pitelis, 
2009a), arguably offer some support to the Japanese perspective and policies (Jovanovic, 
2009). In part due to these developments, recent approaches to competition and industrial 
policies in the Western world have tended to move away from the standard neoclassical 
perspective, and towards an approach and policies aimed at improving competitiveness at 
the firm and macro levels. There are various versions of this new approach. The ‘new 
industrial policy’ approach, for example, retains its neoclassical flavour but emphasises 
input, linkages and technology policies as incentive-compatible means of improving firm 
and industry competitiveness (Audretsch, 1998a). More general competitiveness models, 
such as Michael Porter’s, focus on the role of firm clusters and other determinants of 
competitiveness (Aiginger, 2006b; Porter, 1990). Cluster policy is seen as a new IP 
(Porter, 1998) based on co-opetition. The focus by the EU on education, (soft) 
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infrastructure, technology and innovation, SMEs and clusters in the late 1990s, 
represented a move in this direction.  
The importance of education policy is particularly noteworthy in this context.  In 
a knowledge-based global economy, education and training have become a crucial factor 
for ensuring sustainable competitive advantage. The economic and social returns to 
investment in human capital are well known (see for example OECD, 2009).  Indeed, this 
is why, recognizing the crucial importance of spending in education and training, the EU 
has created initiatives such as Education and Training 2010 work programme which 
focuses, among other things, on raising the skill levels of its workforce, enhancing 
lifelong learning strategies and promoting excellence in higher education system (Council 
of the European Union, 2008).   
An interesting aspect of EU IP in the 2000s is its apparent shift to a non-
neoclassical, arguably evolutionary/resource/system-based approach. Several authors 
have discussed in detail the policies that represent this shift to a new EU industrial policy 
(Pelkmans, 2006; Mosconi, 2005; Smith, 2003). This shift is remarkable, given that from 
the mid-1980s the European Community sought to address the issue of competitiveness 
with the logic of internal market competition, the so-called “competitiveness through 
competition” approach. This in turn had led to the development of an institutional 
framework, a policy regime and a discourse that favoured liberalization (Smith, 2003).  
Beginning in 2002, however, there has been a clear shift in this approach. First of 
all, and importantly, the discourse has changed and with it the rhetoric. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the very term ‘industrial policy’ has returned, following years of 
‘disrepute’ and a focus on ‘horizontal measures’. ‘Horizontal measures’ related to 
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education, innovation and entrepreneurship are critical for economy-wide value creation 
(Pitelis, 2009a). The fundamental question was, and remains, whether and what type of a 
more focused policy toward industry can help foster this objective (see below). Several 
European Commission documents, released since 2002, are noteworthy in this regard. All 
of them use the term ‘industrial policy’, which in itself is significant. 
Indeed, recent EU policy reads very much like the evolutionary, resource, system-
based approach (Pitelis, 1998; 2001). We focus on four recent EU documents or 
statements here (EC, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007). The major themes of the 2002 document 
are the following: industry matters; enlargement is an opportunity; sustainability matters; 
horizontal policy measures need to be applied in response to specific sectoral needs; and 
that policies need to contribute to competitiveness. Following this, the objective of the 
2004 document is for ‘industrial policy’ to accompany the process of industrial change 
(‘deindustrialisation’). Proposed ‘actions’ include a ‘regulation framework,’ ‘synergies of 
policies’ and a ‘sectoral dimension’.    
 It is important to re-emphasize that, with the shift in approach, the ‘sectoral’ 
element has also resurfaced. Following the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy, the 
European Commission has set out an integrated approach to industrial policy. The 
guidelines of this policy can be found in various documents, most comprehensively in the 
2005 EC document. This policy framework not only reinforces the major themes of the 
2002 and 2004 documents, but also focuses on the potential role of industrial policy in 
individual sectors and emphasizes the importance of combining the horizontal and 
sectoral dimensions of European Industrial Policy. To this end, it includes both cross-
sector initiatives (on competitiveness, energy and the environment, intellectual property 
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rights, regulation, research and innovation, market access, skills and structural change) 
and proposes seven new initiatives for individual sectors (pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology, mechanical engineering, space programmes, defense, ICT, and chemicals) 
in addition to the previously existing ones (automotive, shipbuilding, aerospace, textile 
and clothing).   
 Indeed, in EC (2005), emphasis is placed not only on the importance of 
manufacturing and the synthesis of horizontal and sectoral measures but also on the need 
for a synergy between IP, competitiveness, energy and environmental policies in 
achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Programme. The document also explicitly adopts a 
systemic approach and emphasises the role of innovation and regulation in the context of 
globalisation. In addition, the mid-term review of EU industrial policy, as summarized in 
“EU Industrial Policy in Times of Climate Change and Globalization” (EC, 2007), places 
further emphasis on some of these themes, with a particular focus on energy intensive 
industries in the context of environmental impact and international competition, 
globalization and technological development. 
The reasons for this change in approach are various and beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it is worth noting that external pressure (such as the rise of East Asia) 
and decline of the European manufacturing might have played an important role. Certain 
indicators point to the comparative decline of European manufacturing, including for 
example the growth in productivity, slower development in the technology sector and 
lack of sufficient innovative capability (Jamet, 2006). Despite initial success in deepening 
economic integration and strengthening competition within the EU, there is a feeling that 
the emphasis on competition within the internal market is not in itself sufficient to serve 
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as the basis for a dynamic and innovative European economy that would ensure its 
competitiveness on the world stage (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007).  
Corollary to this, demand from political leaders from countries such as Germany 
and France for policy change has also motivated the European Commission to act, the 
most notable example being the April 2002 Financial Times article by former Prime 
Minister of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder. Other public letters by European leaders such 
as Schroeder, Chirac and Blair also expressed fear of “de-industrialization” in the face of 
globalization. More recently, French president Nicolas Sarkozy has called for the EU to 
protect its industry in the face of US protectionism (Vucheva, 2009). Emergency 
measures to rescue the EU banking sector, for example, have in effect suspended EU 
competition policy (The Financial Times, 2009b). The new EU industrial policy, 
therefore, is largely rationalized as a response to the need for deepening the internal 
market and ensuring the competitiveness of the European economy vis-a-vis the 
emergence of new global industrial powers (Jouyet and Verheugen, 2007).    
The importance of industry, ‘deindustrialisation’, ‘competitiveness’, the ‘sectoral 
dimension’, synergies of policies, systemic view, regulation, environmental and energy 
sustainability and the challenges of (semi)-globalisation (and now de-globalisation), in 
the knowledge-based economy, are all well known and accepted themes within the 
resource/systems-based perspective. Indicatively, these are discussed, among many 
others, in Pitelis (1994, 1998, 2001, 2007, 2009a), Pitelis and Antonakis (2003), Edquist 
(2005) and Lundvall (2007). In this context, EU policies in the new millennium are more 
in line than ever before with the evolutionary/resource/system-based view and they 
represent continuous and incremental progress in the right direction. The recent crisis 
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threatens to undermine this as it leads to attempts by EU nation states to protect their own 
(non-EU-wide) interests through national protectionist policies (The Financial Times, 
2009b). They are, therefore, to be welcomed. 
Despite this progress, however, the broad evolutionary/systems-based perspective 
and the (EU) competition-industrial policy implications derived from it suffer from 
various limitations. First, innovation and technological change are seen as the near 
exclusive determinants of value creation. Second, the economic (not just environmental 
and/or energy) sustainability of the value creation process of the system-wide level is not 
actually addressed. Third, value capture by economic agents and its impact on the 
sustainability of value creation are ignored. Fourth, the issue of catching-up and (thus) 
economic integration intra (and extra) EU are not discussed. Fifth, there is little 
recognition of the need to explore the issue of requisite supranational governance 
conducive to sustainable value creation, competitiveness and catching-up. In what 
follows, we attempt to fill these gaps by providing a more comprehensive framework of 
the nature and determinants of value creation, and by analysing the aforementioned 
limitations in this context. 
IV. A New Conceptual Framework and the Issues of Economic Integration and 
Implementation 
 Value, Sustainability and IP 
Wealth creation requires the availability of products, organisations, services, 
institutions and policies, which foster productivity and create value. Two major theories 
on the nature of value and value creation have been developed. The first one is the 
classical theory of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, which attributes ‘value’ to the cost of 
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production, in particular the labour power expended to produce a commodity (the ‘labour 
theory of value’). The other one is the ‘neoclassical’ marginalist notion of ‘value’ of 
Jevons, Menger and others, who conceptualize value as the perceived ‘utility’ provided 
by a good to an economic agent. ‘Utility’, in turn, is affected by ‘scarcity’ (Dobb, 1973). 
The determinants of value and wealth creation were the major theme of Adam 
Smith. In his Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith attributed the wealth-creating abilities of 
market economies to the ‘visible hand’ of the firm and the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. 
In his analysis of the ‘pin factory’, Smith observed how specialisation, the division of 
labour, teamwork and invention create value and engender productivity. The marvels of 
the ‘visible hand’ were they realised in exchange by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market: 
the free interplay of demand and supply by economic agents in pursuit of their own 
interest. The invisible hand helps to provide information, incentives, coordination, and to 
realise value through exchange. Competition can ensure that ‘natural’ prices will tend to 
emerge. Restrictive practices by, for example, ‘people of the same trade’ will hinder this 
outcome, calling thus for restraint and/or regulation.6 In the classical tradition, 
international wealth creation and convergence may follow from Ricardo’s theory of 
‘comparative advantage’; a result predicated, however, on the absence of increasing 
returns (Pitelis, 2009a). 
In the neoclassical tradition, the focus shifted from value creation in production 
and realisation in markets, to exchange relationships, subjective value and efficiency in 
resource allocation. The aim of economics became one of ‘economising’, of rational 
choices between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses (Robbins, 1935). 
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Given scarcity, rationality and the need for economising, the economic aim became one 
of achieving an efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
Efficient allocation has both a static and an intertemporal dimension. The former 
can be achieved through perfectly competitive markets. The latter depends on innovation 
and technological change. Unlike static efficiency, perfect competition or perfect 
contestability (a market with free entry and costless exit) need not lead to intertemporal 
efficiency, as they remove the incentive to introduce innovations - the Schumpeterian 
reward of transient ‘excess profits’. For Baumol (1991), who echoes Penrose (1959), the 
best type of market structure from the point of view of intertemporal efficiency is big 
business competition. The potential presence of increasing returns, originally pointed out 
by Young (1928), suggests that imperfect market structures could well be inevitable, too. 
Nonetheless, despite such challenges, neoclassical economists seem to share the 
belief that perfectly competitive markets and free trade can deliver the goods, and lead to 
sustainable value/wealth creation. This is true, for example, for the various Washington 
and post-Washington consensus-type views (Bailey et al., 2006; Pitelis, 2009a; Rodrik, 
2009). A problem with the above reasoning, however, is that it fails to focus on 
innovation as a determinant of value creation. Moreover, it also fails to realise that 
wealth/ economic performance includes both a value creation and a value 
appropriation/capture element (and that the latter may impact negatively on the 
sustainability of the former). The resource-system approach improves upon the 
neoclassical one by focusing on innovation but it shares the other limitations discussed 
above. We try to rectify this below by synthesising and extending the resource allocation 
and resource creation views. 
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In a capitalist economy, value is co-created at the level of production (Pitelis, 
2009b). It is then realised in exchange through the sale of commodities in markets for a 
profit. Scarcity affects value, but so does the cost of production. The efficient use of 
scarce resources, notably time, can be instrumental in increasing productivity. Firms are 
critical players in this context. The infrastructure of firms (organisation, management, 
systems), their strategy and corporate governance, their technology and innovativeness, 
the quantity, the quality and relations of their human resources (managers, entrepreneurs, 
labour) and the non-human ones, as well as their ability to exploit unit cost economies 
(such as economies of scale, scope, learning, growth, transaction costs and external) are 
also important determinants of productivity and value creation (Pitelis, 1998; 2009b).  
These determinants are affected by the external environment, which is comprised of two 
layers.  The first layer is the meso-environment, which is industry conduct and structure 
and the consequent industry ‘degree of monopoly’.  The ‘degree of monopoly’ serves to 
realise value by determining the price/cost margin of the industry (see Cowling, 1982). 
The meso level also includes locational aspects and the regional milieu to include the 
region’s ‘social capital’ (see Putnam, 1993). The four determinants at the firm level, in 
their interrelationship with the ‘external meso-environment’, determine productivity and 
value creation at the industry, sectoral and regional levels, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Moving outwards, the macro-environment (which includes the macro-economic 
policy mix and the nature and level of effective demand) has an impact on the context in 
which firms and industry operate and determines the current ‘size of the market’, and the 
value that can be realised at any point in time. The macro-environment also includes the 
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institutional context and, in particular, the ‘governance mix’, which is the ‘market-
hierarchy-cooperation’ mix of economic governance.  
The institutional environment provides ‘sanctions and rewards’, culture and 
attitudes and the overall ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1981). The ‘governance mix’ 
determines the overall efficiency of the mode through which the whole economy 
operates. The attached ‘wheel of a nation’ is influenced by the global context, which is 
the sum of each nation’s ‘wheel’, the synergies between the ‘wheels’, and the institutions 
and organisations of global governance. They have an impact on the size of the global 
market and the overall ability of ‘The Earth’ to generate value and wealth. The capitalist 
firm is positioned centre stage in the wheel. Another important ‘actor’ is the government. 
It may, and does, influence the institutional and macroeconomic context, through laws, 
regulations, ‘leadership’, etc. The government can affect the meso-environment through 
its competition, industrial and regulation policies and the macro-environment through its 
macroeconomic policies.7 It influences the determinants of value creation through its 
education and health policies, the provision of national infrastructure, as well as policies 
relating to innovation, ‘social capital’ and entrepreneurship.   
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Both the neoclassical and resource systems views fail to appreciate that value 
creation need not automatically imply value appropriation (or value capture). To 
appropriate value privately, firms (and also individuals and nations) pursue a panoply of 
value capture strategies; for example, firms can pursue monopolistic and collusive 
practices. Nations can adopt strategic trade policies while creating competitive 
advantages (Amsden, 2008) and adopting “positioning strategies” (Pitelis, 2009a). All 
FIGURE 1: The ‘Wheel’ of Nations: the determinants of productivity and value creation  
at the firm, meso and national levels 
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these can help countries to appropriate created value and therefore enhance their 
competitiveness and accelerate their catching-up (Pitelis, 2009a). However, the pursuit of 
value capture by one agent (whether legitimate or not) may impact negatively on the 
ability of another agent to further his/her objectives. This in turn may undermine the 
sustainability of the value creation process.  This is an ‘agency’ issue which, however, is 
more complex and wider than the traditional neoclassical forms of owners and 
shareholders.8 What we have in effect is multiple agency, hierarchically structured – that 
is, a hierarchy of agencies, between firms, nations and the world as a whole (as well as, 
of course, their various sub-units). 
Starting first from the controlling group of the firm (the ‘agent’) and the 
corporation as an entity comprising of the sum of its stakeholders (the ‘principal’), it can 
be that the pursuit of personal interests by the former compromise those of the latter. 
This, for example, is the case when the former pursue strategies that favour short-term 
share valuation growth and personal compensation packages and perks, which are beyond 
those required to provide them with adequate incentives to pursue the interest of the 
corporation as a whole, that is, sustainable value creation and capture. This undermines 
the sustainability of the corporation as a whole, and has understandably been the focus of 
recent corporate governance debates. The second layer is that of the corporation as the 
agent and the government as the principal. The ability of firms to realise value/wealth 
can, and often does, lead them to attempt to capture wealth as ‘rent’ through monopolistic 
and restrictive practices. A high degree of market power can thwart incentives to 
innovation and may prove to be inimical to productivity and value creation. In this 
context, the government (and its governance) becomes crucial. Sustainable productivity 
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and value creation requires competition and regulation policies that can thwart the 
creation and use of monopoly power (while allowing for an innovations-inducing ‘degree 
of monopoly’), as well as policies that support small firm creation and survival and the 
diagnosis and upgrading of regional clusters. 
In the third layer, nations themselves, now seen as the agents, can try to capture 
value by adopting strategic trade policies that can harm the process of global wealth 
creation. The aim of the ‘global community’ (now the ‘principal’) should be to require 
individual governments to adopt policies that enhance global productivity and 
value/wealth creation. Indicatively, governments of developed economies should refrain 
from policies that restrain trade, yet recognise the need of other governments to ‘foster’ 
infant firms and industries, for their expected competition, innovation and productivity 
effects. This is decidedly not the case in recent years.  Following the recent crisis, 
protectionist policies by developed countries are now rampant in the USA and EU, 
threatening economic sustainability (see for example The Economist, 17 September, 
2009). 
The absence of global knowledge and a global monitor calls for diversity. In any 
country or society, a host of organisations and institutions exists - the family, the church, 
consumer associations, NGOs, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) - that can affect, through 
their interaction, the ability of firms’ and governments’ incentives to foster the process of 
productivity and value/wealth enhancement game. In this context, the issue is the 
specialisation and division of labour of alternative institutions and organisations, based 
on their respective capabilities in production, exchange, legitimacy, ideology and culture, 
and the identification of institutional and organisational configurations and conducts that 
 30 
promote efficiency in the form of enhanced productivity and value creation. Competition 
and cooperation, self-interest and altruism, big businesses and smaller cooperating firms 
(such as in clusters) can all have an impact on the goal of sustainable productivity/value 
improvements. 
A focus on the sustainability of value creation has implications for environmental, 
distribution and social policies, including migration, all of which follow endogenously 
from our proposed perspective. Excessive inequities in distribution and the abuse of the 
environment can thwart a country’s ability to generate value. Limited health care and 
inadequate education undermine a country’s more potent and valuable resource – the 
human. This threatens sustainability. Policies designed to deal with such problems are 
also part of a government’s remit. In the absence of a ‘Dr Pangloss’, an approximate way 
of effecting sustainable value creation is through the free interplay, pluralism and 
diversity of institutions, organisations, individuals, ideas, cultures, religions, norms, 
customs and civilisations, as each can serve, in part, as a ‘steward’ or ‘monitor’ for the 
others. Having said this, it is crucial that this process is ‘managed’, ‘guided’ and 
‘moulded’ through informed agency, so that democracy is married to performance. This 
brings the issue of supranational ‘governance’ and ‘power structures’ centre stage. A 
fundamental question is whether different types of power structures and thus 
supranational governance impact differently on sustainable value creation. It is beyond 
the scope of this article to address this issue in detail, but some observations can be made. 
First, for corporate and public governance to contribute towards sustainable value 
and wealth creation, internal and also external controls are required, including national, 
supranational and global incentives and sanctions. Importantly, it is necessary to 
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eliminate corruption at all levels: intra-firm, intra-country (regulatory capture) between 
host governments and multinationals, and inter-nationally. All these presuppose a degree 
of trust, social capital and the ‘ethical dimension’. Exclusive focus on self-interest may 
well be the strongest foe of sustainability. 
Innovation, competition and cooperation (co-opetition) can positively influence 
all determinants of value creation. All the same, productivity enhancements may lead to 
advantages that can be used to restrict competition. The need for a competition (anti-
trust) and cooperation (co-opetition) policy thus arises from the need not to thwart the 
beneficial effects of co-opetition on productivity and value creation. Firm cooperating 
strategies (for example, firm clusters) that enhance productivity should be facilitated in 
this context. Non-value enhancing forms of cooperation (like collusion), on the other 
hand, should be discouraged. The same is true for other restrictive business practices. 
Mergers and acquisitions should be examined on a case-by-case basis, as they may have 
value enhancing attributes (Jorde and Teece, 1992; Mueller, 2006), but they may also 
lead to market power, which can eventually stifle incentives for innovation and 
productivity. Pluralism and diversity should be encouraged, as they provide benchmarks 
for information comparison. Institutional changes that facilitate a productivity enhancing 
culture and ideology and value-adding legal frameworks should also be aimed at.  
Industrial and competition policies should be compatible with macro-economic 
and other policies (notably education and health), but they should also be supported by a 
facilitatory institutional context. Douglass North (1981) has shown the importance of 
institutions and institutional change in reducing transaction and transformation costs and 
in increasing productivity and growth. Institutions, but also culture, attitudes and 
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ideology can be hugely important factors in economic organisation. Governments can be 
a potent catalyst in institutional change, as they possess a monopoly of force and the 
ability to legislate and regulate. Devising a facilitatory framework is part and parcel of 
industrial and competition policy. The neoclassical ‘market failure’ theory of the state 
assumes the institutional context is a given (Clarke and Pitelis, 1993). The possibility to 
vary it implies a more proactive role for the state. Olson (2005), for example, refers to the 
‘market augmentation’ role of states. This could be extended to over not just 
augmentation of existing markets, but also creation of markets and co-creation, as well as 
the surrounding eco-system, which involved competitors, customers, suppliers and (thus) 
clusters (Pitelis and Teece, 2009). 
In sum, our analysis points to the need for a broader conceptual framework for 
industrial and competition policy, to account for the role of innovation, cooperation, 
institutions and knowledge creation through institutional diversity and pluralism as well 
as market creation and co-creation. The need for a tough competition policy that 
discourages the emergence and exploitation of market dominance is maintained and 
strengthened in this framework. It is also extended to account for ‘power structures’ by 
individuals, nations and groups of nations, such as the EU. Our discussion of value 
capture, the role of ‘embedded power structures’ and the hierarchy of agencies goes 
further than extant neoclassical and resource-systems-based perspectives. It puts centre 
stage the issue of global sustainable value creation and its potential foes. This raises the 
issue of diversity and ‘global governance’ to thwart anti-sustainability practices of 
powerful players such as the EU itself. Consider, for example, the support the EU 
provides to Airbus and/or its Common Agricultural Policy. Both are anti-sustainability 
 33 
and they thwart competition, innovation and trade. However, they are likely to continue 
to do so in the absence of diversity, stewardship and monitoring, alongside enlightenment 
and global monitoring. In practice, a supranational competition and regulation agency 
could arguably help address the issues of embedded power structures, the hierarchy of 
agencies, and sustainable value creation that neither the neoclassical nor the resource and 
systems-based perspectives address. 
The aforementioned critical remarks on the evolutionary, resource-systems 
approach should not hide the fact that we feel this to be an improvement over 
neoclassical ideas and a step in the right direction. Innovation incorporates, by its very 
nature, sustainability and value capture characteristics that, up to a point, could help 
marry value capture to sustainable value creation. However, it does not suffice. In 
addition, sustainable value creation need not automatically imply competitiveness and 
economic integration, let alone addressing issues of implementation. 
Economic Integration and Issues of Implementation  
A problem with much of extant discussion concerning the role of competition and 
industrial policies is that it presupposes the existence of well-functioning markets, an 
entrepreneurial class and an educated and skilled workforce, and the existence of a 
structural and institutional framework, which facilitate the implementation of chosen 
policies. This is evidently not the case in emerging and transition countries but still not 
entirely the case in the EU either. The internal market in the EU, while integrated, 
continues to suffer from barriers to cross-border trade and investment (especially in 
services) and slow development of an internal market for knowledge. It also suffers from 
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slow and sometimes incomplete implementation of directives and inappropriate 
instruments (Ilzkovitz et al. 2007).  
In the above context, it is important for nation states to engender the development 
of institutions and capabilities which are necessary to adopt industrial and competition 
policies in the first place. 
Implementing industrial and competition policies requires setting up requisite 
authorities.  Here the selection of competent, knowledgeable and independently minded 
individuals is crucial. They should aim at ensuring sustainable competitiveness, an 
important determinant of which is competition. They should not be ‘captive’ to business 
or other interests, and should coordinate with regulatory bodies and other authorities, 
domestically and internationally (Pitelis, 2003; Rodrik, 2009). They should be able to 
devise clearly articulated and transparent rules concerning the acquisition and abuse of 
dominant positions and vehicles for their attainment, such as mergers and acquisitions, as 
well as restrictive practices. At the same time they should recognize that competition 
policy is not a panacea for competitiveness; competitiveness depends significantly on the 
other determinants discussed. All these issues are closely interlinked. This implies the 
need for a systemic approach to industrial and competition policy that tries to address 
simultaneously the issues of doing, while also addressing the prerequisites, such as 
capability building.   
Building on our earlier discussion, industrial and competition policies should thus 
not only be linked to the degree of competition in industries, but should aim at improving 
productivity and efficient resource allocation and creation. A prerequisite to achieving 
this is to encourage inter- and intra-firm competition so as to nurture conditions 
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favourable to the creation of new ideas, techniques, products, processes, organizational 
and institutional forms and, moreover, to exploit best for this purpose the information 
available - providing (and enhancing) attributes of economic organizations, notably 
markets, firms, states and people  at large.  Competition policy should provide incentives, 
support, mechanisms and institutions for achieving productivity and competitiveness, for 
example through linkages, joint inputs and resource mobility (Audretsch, 1998a). It 
should address ‘state’ capture by sectional interests – in part through striving for 
conditions of contestability in private and (up to a point) political markets – and a 
plurality of institutional and organizational forms, including, for example, support for 
SMEs. Pluralism can also enhance the generation and use of new knowledge. 
The exact measures which need to be taken to achieve the above can vary. For 
example, the recognition of the benefits of cooperation, and therefore the need to ensure 
competition and cooperation, suggest the need for measures facilitating the ‘clustering’ of 
SMEs (Best, 1990; Best and Forrant, 1996). ‘Clusters’ of SMEs can also be a potent 
source of indigenous development for less favoured regions, countering a dependence on 
multinational firms, and can themselves be a determinant of inward investment (Pitelis, 
2009a). 
Firm size remains essential for efficiency through economies of scale and 
learning. M&As are often an easy way to do this and to rationalize, especially in 
declining sectors. A minimum efficient scale is also essential to compete in export 
markets. An alternative to acquiring the benefits of scale can be through clustering. 
Theory and (our own) experience (Pitelis, 2003) suggest the following “good practice”. 
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1. Explore the possibilities of clustering. When these are present, try to develop clusters. 
2. Allow and if need be encourage M&As of SMEs where clustering is not possible, and 
where benefits from scale are required for competitiveness. 
3. Promote competition by gradually removing barriers to domestic competition, import 
competition, and export rivalry. Regulate any natural monopolies. 
 
The successful implementation of industrial and competition policies requires an 
appropriate institutional framework. As put by North, ‘the central issue of economic 
history and of economic development is to account for the evolution of political and 
economic institutions that create an economic environment that induces increasing 
productivity’ (1991, 98). Examples of required institutional measures include the 
delineation and enforcement of property rights, education and health provision, and a 
pluralism of organizational forms and ownership structures, which exploit existing, and 
generate new, knowledge through economies of pluralism. It is also important to promote 
attitudes, values and generally culture conducive to dynamic competitiveness through 
innovativeness, thus to productivity, growth and convergence. Of course, these are easier 
said than done. A way through which these can be achieved is with the government 
assuming the role of a catalyst, by identifying and implementing, in close cooperation 
with the private sector, changes proposed by those nearer to the action, such as the 
private sector itself. Such bottom-up policies exploit dispersed knowledge and also 
promote subsidiarity and democracy. Precise actions, however, should be based on an 
analysis of each particular case. This is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following 
methodology can be proposed: first, a consensually agreed upon theoretical framework; 
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second, an audit of the external (international) environment; third, an audit of the internal 
(national) environment; fourth, deciding the direction of the strategy; fifth, its 
dimensions; sixth, the required actions; seventh, addressing the issues of prerequisites, 
resources and mechanisms for implementation; eighth, feasible actions; ninth, control-
evaluation; and tenth, new actions for implementation (Pitelis, 2003). 
To conclude, industrial and competition policy should focus on the nurturing of 
institutions, mechanisms, organizations and resources (notably human) that foster 
dynamic efficiency, productivity and value creation, competition and cooperation (co-
opetition), other than price collusion. 
Concerning the degree of competition per se, any measures taken to promote 
domestic competition by developing-emerging nations, should work alongside import 
competition and export rivalry. When steps are taken to support domestic industry, these 
should not be allowed to consolidate and become disincentives for improved 
competitiveness. A clear phasing out and performance-monitoring strategy should be in 
place. Measures to remove barriers to mobility are essential in this respect, as there seems 
to be the need to coordinate entry and exit policies (Frydman et al., 1999). In this context, 
mergers should be discouraged when there is risk of monopoly power and strategic 
barriers to entry, and mainly encouraged between SMEs. 
Co-opetition should be of the type described in the case of clusters. Clustering can 
and should be seen as a new form of competition and industrial policy (Porter, 1998; 
Pitelis 2003). Clusters can provide locally-based development and can also be an 
attraction to inward investment.  They are of the utmost importance in that they 
 38 
simultaneously facilitate entrepreneurship, decentralization and locationally specific 
advantages.   
Overall, in their complex interrelationships, the exploitation of knowledge 
through the existence of a plurality of institutional and organizational forms, the benefits 
of co-opetition also arising from these and appropriate competition policies, the related 
amelioration of the problem of state capture, and the parallel exploitation of the benefits 
of clustering, can help enhance competitiveness, especially when combined with 
appropriate value appropriation and “positioning” strategies (Pitelis, 2009a).  
To summarize, industrial and competition policies should aim to enhance the 
benefits from competition and cooperation (co-opetition) for innovation, productivity and 
value creation. As noted, such benefits can fail to materialize when strong firms and 
nations employ their power to restrain competition and trade. In this context, mergers that 
can lead to the acquisition of monopoly power should be discouraged, as well as 
restrictive and collusive practices. Strategic trade policies, especially by developed 
nations, should be monitored and strongly discouraged. 
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
Industrial and competition policies were long being motivated by neoclassical 
ideas, which are currently challenged by alternative views. In practice competition 
policies varied between and within countries and were often inconsistent with their 
alleged objectives.  We suggested that the theory of value creation requires a synthesis of 
resource allocation and resource creation but also the identification of the requisite power 
structures that allow value creation not to be prejudiced by value capture. We developed 
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a perspective on the determinants of value creation at the firm, meso and supranational 
levels. We then explored the limitations of extant theory of the firm, concerning 
governance and value in its context, and explored some prerequisites of economic 
sustainability. Such sustainability requires both internal and external controls including 
the market, but also hierarchy (firm and state), as well as institutional and global controls. 
Institutional diversity and pluralism can help effect mutual ‘stewardship’ and monitoring. 
For sustainable value creation, corporate governance needs to be aligned with national 
and global governance in a way that thwarts the potentially negative impact of some 
agents’ pursuit of value capture on sustainable value creation.  
Industrial and competition policies should be seen within the broader context of 
enhancing sustainable value creation. Competition policy should aim at maximising the 
net benefits from co-opetition. The road to sustainable value creation is not one-way. 
Countries should exploit the informational benefits from the existence of a plurality of 
institutional and organisational forms. Theory and history suggest there are no panaceas. 
Current EU policies are a step in the right direction, but need to pay more attention to the 
issue of economic sustainability, the link between corporate, public and global 
governance, and the impact of different power structures and hierarchies of agencies on 
industrial policies for sustainable value creation. The limitations of self-monitoring and 
diversity suggest the need for supranational competition and regulatory policy 
organisation with sustainability as its core agenda. This may operate alongside 
enlightenment and mutual stewardship and monitoring to help sustain the value creation 
process. Sustainable value creation need not automatically lead to integration and 
catching-up. For this to be effected special considerations apply, not least good practice 
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implementation. Industrial policies can also help facilitate European economic integration 
and enhance the EU’s competitiveness and catching-up (with the US), thus realising its 
potential and goals.  
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NOTES 
1. Industry usually refers to manufacturing. This, however, tends to recede, given an 
emerging fuzziness of the boundaries between manufacturing and services; see Pitelis 
and Antonakis (2003) for a discussion.  
2. For other definitions and a discussion of international competitiveness see Aigigner 
(2006a, 2006b), Pitelis (2009a). 
3. Well known early oligopoly models were the ‘limit pricing’, the contestable markets 
and the ‘generalised oligopoly’ models. Whether prices will be competitive (or 
contestable), limit prices or monopoly prices will depend on the existence of barriers to 
entry and exit (mobility barriers). These need not be only structural (such as minimum 
efficient scale), but can also be strategic, through conscious action by firms to restrict 
entry. Instead of reducing prices, however, firms can follow other strategies such as 
advertising, innovating, investing in excess capacity and/or producing many apparently 
competing products (product proliferation) with the express purpose of reducing entry. 
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Depending on the extent and degree of success of such actions, the resulting industry 
price-output outcome can be anywhere between perfect competition and monopoly (see 
Pitelis, 1994). 
4. See Wignaraja (2003), Edquist (2005), Lundvall (2007) and Pitelis (2007, 2009a).  
5. However, it would be dangerous to generalise. For example, it is questionable as to 
whether the European commercial aircraft industry could have developed without 
government support. 
6. Schumpeter (1942) later emphasised the role of innovation and creative destruction as 
a determinant of economic performance. Penrose (1959) explained firm endogenous 
growth through intra-firm knowledge creation, leading to ‘excess resources’, an incentive 
for growth. Building on Penrose, Richardson (1972) has pointed to the ubiquitous nature 
of inter-firm cooperation, in forms other than price collusion. 
7. On the link between industrial and macroeconomic policies, see Michie and Pitelis 
(1998) and Bailey and Cowling (2006). 
8. See Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Berle and Means (1932), and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). 
9. See Bianchi and Labory (2006) and special issues of the International Review of 
Applied Economics (2006), the Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (2006) and 
Policy Studies (2007).  
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